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B r a s i l i a  o r  t h e  L i m i t s  o f  T h e o r y
We consistently use theoretical frameworks to inform our 
understanding of  cities and urban processes.  However, it is 
always people who make decisions and thereby define the 
nature and development of  cities.  Yet, people have biases, 
identities, and particular interests that are part of  both 
the way they experience cities and the vision they have of  
what the city ought to be.  Therefore, cities are contested 
spaces and urban processes the result of  amorphous, tacit, 
and ongoing negotiations.  Nevertheless, access to the 
“negotiation table” (the city itself), where the “fate” of  
the city is decided, is not equally distributed among city 
dwellers.  Inevitably, it seems, some residents have a greater 
ability or, perhaps most importantly, better possibilities 
to influence decisions because of  their social status, 
economic or political power, or the amount of  resources 
they command. It indeed seems, as George Orwell put it 
not so long ago, that all people are equal but that some are 
more equal than others.
Modernist planning theory tried to change this.  It assumed 
that planning, architecture, and urban design by themselves 
could transform society and create new forms of  collective 
association and personal habits.  Furthermore, modernist 
planning theory assumed that if  the correct set of  ideas 
(a theory) was implemented, people could get rid of  their 
biases and particular interests in favor of  a collective, 
classless and egalitarian society and “a new order of  urban 
life” (Holston 1998, 41).  As Holston (1989) shows in 
his book The Modernist City, an Anthropological Critique of  
Brasilia, this theory was implemented to its furthest extent 
in Brasilia—the new Brazilian capital planned, designed, 
and built in the 1950s.
Holston’s book is a study of  Brasilia from multiple but 
intertwined perspectives. In the first part of  the book, The 
Myth of  the Concrete, Holston traces the origin of  Brasilia—
the reasons, both overt and hidden, behind the decision to 
build a new capital.  Moreover, he explains the planning and 
architectural modernist principles used in the layout and 
design of  the city, and the way the Brazilian government 
justified its construction.
In the second part of  the book, The City Defamiliarized, 
Holston analyzes how Brasilia, and modernist planning in 
general, tries to make the city “strange” in order to achieve 
the transformation of  society.  Moreover, by neglecting 
the street and blurring the distinction between public and 
private space, modernist planning attempts to impose a new 
urban order and negate the usual expectations about urban 
life.  Finally, in the third part of  the book, The Recovery of  
History, Holston traces the process by which Brasilia ended 
up contradicting its own premises, those of  a new, classless 
and egalitarian society, by granting specific rights within 
the city to particular social groups and thereby neglecting 
to grant the same rights to others.  Furthermore, he 
describes how Brasilienses, as the people from Brasilia are 
called, have, to a certain degree, “Brazilianized” Brasilia, 
thus neglecting the proposed new urban life and the 
restructuring of  Brazilian society.  Holston concludes that 
modernist theory, as carried out in Brasilia, not only failed 
to solve or avoid the problems it intended to solve but 
even made them more explicit and acute.
B r a s i l i a  a n d  M o d e r n i s t  T h e o r y  
The chosen site for Brasilia did not, as location theory could 
suggest, respond to economic reasons and was thus not 
located in the middle of  Brazil in order to minimize costs 
of  production or transportation.  Instead, Brasilia was built 
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in the middle of  Brazil, mostly for symbolic reasons, as 
the symbol of  a new and modern Brazil that, supposedly, 
would include all Brazilians.  Additionally, its design and 
construction were intended as the means to create a new 
era of  national development and economic growth.  As 
Holston (1989) states, “Brasilia was to be the cause, not the 
result, of  economic development” (83). 
Brasilia embodies many of  the premises of  modernist 
architecture, especially those of  the International Congress 
of  Modern Architecture (CIAM by its French acronym) 
and its most vociferous and known advocate, the Swiss/
French architect Le Corbusier.  Le Corbusier was extremely 
influenced by the mechanical and technological revolution 
of  the assembly line. Fordism, taylorism, scientific 
management, and the link between technology and social 
change were essential to his view of  social regeneration 
expressed in his architecture and urban projects (McLeod 
1983). Moreover, he believed that the city, if  it was to 
survive, had to become the “ultimate machine,” i.e. an 
efficient, mechanized and standardized city with a central 
authority “capable of  coordinating all the phases of  design 
and production” (Fishman 1977, 189). 
In his 1933 proposal, La Ville Radieuse (the Radiant 
City), Le Corbusier organized the city along two main 
transportation axes or superhighways designed especially 
for the automobile, separated functions into mutually 
exclusive sectors, and included egalitarian high-rise 
apartments set in vast, green, open spaces—superblocks or 
superquadras, as they are called in Brasilia—where workers 
were to live according to their needs and not to their social 
position. These principles, Le Corbusier believed, would 
make possible a new social structure: abolish the separation 
between (decayed) peripheries and (prosperous) central 
cities, incorporate all classes, and distribute urban benefits 
among all residents (Fishman 1977, Le Corbusier 1987).
Lucio Costa adopted this Le Corbusian model in his 
winning Master Plan for Brasilia. Costa organized the 
Plano Piloto, as the city itself  is usually called, along two 
transportation axes or superhighways devoted to motorized 
transportation.  Likewise, he separated diverse functions 
into mutually exclusive sectors: government buildings, 
offices, recreational services, and main commercial areas 
along the Monumental Axe; and apartment blocks and some 
commercial areas along the Residential Axe.  Moreover, the 
government gave all future Brasilia inhabitants, regardless 
of  social status or class, an apartment in the superquadras.
In sum, Brasilia was planned according to a defined and 
explicit set of  ideas set forth by modernist planning theory, 
and its Master Plan aimed to create the foundations of  an 
egalitarian urban organization.  The plan, however, failed 
miserably. 
F r o m  C o l l e c t i v e  U s e - v a l u e s  t o 
P r i v a t i z e d  E x c h a n g e - v a l u e s
 
The modernist planning theory that inspired Brasilia’s 
design attributed the urban and social crisis to both the 
dominance of  private interests in the development of  cities 
and the accumulation of  wealth. As Logan and Molotch 
(1987) argue, the city is in great part a result of  the conflict 
between the interests of  rentiers, landowners and other 
place entrepreneurs (the “growth machine”) seeking to 
maximize exchange values, and that of  residents seeking 
to increase use values.  Brasilia’s planner and the Brazilian 
government aimed to avoid this conflict by retaining 
ownership of  all land and most of  the buildings, including 
the apartments.  Furthermore, they tried to enhance use 
values through the state-sponsored provision of  several 
services and amenities: childcare, resource centers, space 
for communal activities, and vast amounts of  open green 
space. However, the characteristics Logan and Molotch 
(1987) identify as the basis of  residents’ use values were not 
present in Brasilia.  Its “neighborhoods,” the superquadra, 
did not become the place where daily needs were satisfied 
nor were they the source of  informal networks.  Moreover, 
since all apartments and superquadras were strikingly similar, 
the Brasilian neighborhood did not become a source of  
identity.  Instead of  forging collective associations, Brasilia’s 
superquadras isolated and standardized residents.
 
By the end on the 1960s, the Brazilian state, under the 
pressure of  the city’s elite, finally sold the apartments, 
and a real estate market developed.  In a matter of  years, 
market forces marginalized lower-income and poor 
residents who were not able to pay free-market rents.  This 
process quickly consolidated the center for the upper strata 
and relegated those in the lower strata to the periphery. 
Moreover, it represents the rejection of  the collectivity of  
the superquadra in favor of  the free-market and the failure 
of  one of  modernist theory basic principles: the creation 
of  a classless society.
F r o m  E g a l i t a r i a n  U t o p i a  t o 
S e g r e g a t e d  R e a l i t y
 
Brasilia segregates in different ways.  As was mentioned 
above, the city was planned along two highways designed 
especially for the automobile, which for Le Corbusier 
was the symbol of  the machine age, progress, speed and 
efficiency.  However, access to a car implies a certain amount 
of  economic resources most poor and low-income people 
do not have.  Just as the spatial mismatch in American cities 
makes it difficult for inner-city poor to access better jobs 
and opportunities in the suburbs (Goldsmith and Blakely 
1992, Abrahamson 1996), the mostly poor or low-income 
inhabitants of  Brasilia’s satellite towns, which developed 
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despite being prohibited, do not have easy access to the 
Plano Piloto. This, as Holston (1989) argues, “places the 
poor at a distinct disadvantage both in finding and in 
keeping a job” (160) and also leads to a stratified use of  
the city according to class lines.
 
Brasilia also denies the possibility of  articulating different 
visions of  the city through public life.  Even if  Brasilia has 
plenty of  accessible open space, few people use it because 
Brasilienses “no longer see themselves as participating in 
an outdoor public domain of  social life” (Holston 1989, 
311).  By designing a city for the automobile, Brasilia 
eliminated the spontaneity, openness, and democratic 
feeling of  Jane Jacobs’ streets (Berman 1988, 318).  The 
street, what Lewis Mumford called “the theater of  social 
activity” and interaction, is not in Brasilia the place for 
unexpected encounters, street games, or the little shop 
around the corner; the casual conversation, the night walk, 
or the spontaneous interaction of  different people from 
different backgrounds.  Likewise, there are no “eyes upon 
the street” (Jacobs 1961, 35) in Brasilia, and the street is 
no longer, as Jacobs’ streets are, the heart of  the city.  As 
a result, social life is confined to private spaces, accessible 
only to those considered equals, and stratified according to 
social class or economic well-being.  Much in the same way 
as the divide between American suburbs and inner cities, 
Brasilia’s public life is confined to interior spaces that do 
not reproduce the outdoor, unrestricted public life of  the 
street, where noncommercial activities such as discussion, 
protest, or celebration occurs between and within different 
social groups.  Brasilia’s shopping malls, private clubs, and 
exclusive residential enclaves, like American suburban 
malls, neighborhood associations, and gated communities, 
exclude those who do not belong and create a social 
divide among those who have and those who have not. 
Moreover, the possibility of  mediation and interaction 
between classes and social groups is limited and those in a 
less favorable position, as Abrahamson (1996), Goldsmith 
and Blakely (1992), and Wacquant (1997) show, become 
marginalized and confined to an inferior quality of  life and 
lesser opportunities.  Moreover, in Brasilia, as Dreir et al 
(2001) persuasively argued for American cities, place also 
matters. Brasilienses’ possibilities of  success seem to be 
inversely related to the distance between place of  residence 
and the Plano Piloto. In sum, truly public spaces, where 
social life occurs, diverse interests are negotiated, and the 
city is experienced, that is, where “substantive citizenship” 
(Holston 1998) is internalized and expressed, are absent in 
Brasilia: space in Brasilia has been privatized.
 
In this sense, Brasilia reproduces, and even maximizes, the 
distinction between privileged center (the Plano Piloto), 
and underprivileged periphery (satellite towns) that is so 
common in other Brazilian and Latin American cities, and 
inversely so in the United States.  As Holston (1989) shows, 
the percentage of  people living in Brasilia’s periphery is 
greater than in other Brazilian cities.  Likewise, Brasilia 
completely separates elite and middle-class residential 
quarters (the Plano Piloto) from lower class neighborhood 
and slums (satellite towns), whereas in other cities they 
are intertwined at least to a certain degree.  Moreover, this 
separation is spatially unequivocal.  Brasilia’s Plano Piloto 
is surrounded by a “green belt” (a provision set in the 
Master Plan) and the closest satellite town is 12 miles away 
from the city center.  Finally, Brasilia’s income differences 
between center and periphery are far greater than in 
other Brazilian cities.  All these facts contradict the plans’ 
egalitarian intentions. 
C o n c l u s i o n s
 
Brasilia clearly demonstrates the role of  government in 
promoting inequality, as Fishman (1999), Goldsmith and 
Blakely (1992), and Dreir et al (2001) show for America. 
Brasilia’s plan created a city for an elite bureaucracy, “a 
minority population with privileged access to a public 
domain of  resources which excluded the vast majority” 
(Holston 1989, 205).  Moreover, Brasilia’s reality completely 
contradicts both the planners’ and government’s intentions, 
which aimed to transform society and create a new social 
structure.  Instead, the segregation and inequality that 
Brasilia created exceeds that of  other Brazilian cities, which 
seems to support the argument of  Dreir et al (2001) that 
treating unequals equally reinforces inequality.
 
Brasilia is a clear example of  the limitations of  theory 
itself.  Modernist planning did provide Brasilia’s planners 
with a specific and explicit set of  guidelines, concepts, and 
principles.  However, it created a “formalistic shell for 
living” that did not transform the status quo but made it even 
more explicit.  The development of  Brasilia demonstrates 
that cities are the consequence of  personal decisions 
and choices; moreover, that they are not products but 
processes.  Even if  the process is determined a priori, the 
product cannot be because people, actual, real people, are 
unpredictable.  Holston (1998, 46) argues that modernist 
planning theory failed to consider the unintended and the 
unexpected as part of  the model.  It should be noted that 
in fact all social theory would never be able to plan for the 
unexpected; cities and humans are way too complex for 
that.  The planner, the architect, the politician, the social 
scientist, can only try “to create conditions that might set 
in motion processes” (Abu-Lughod 1993, 32; emphasis 
added). 
 
At the end of  his book, Holston (1989) states that, “We 
need not attempt to resolve the paradoxes of  planning… 
Instead, as social critics, we need to retain the kind of  
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commitment to planning, to alternative features, which 
acknowledges and even emphasizes the necessary dilemma 
of  being caught between the utopian contradictions 
of  imagining a better world and the unacceptability of  
reproducing the status quo” (317).  It is for understanding 
the dilemma and for informing the process, not for 
providing totalizing solutions, that we need theory. 
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